Perfect for the job? Overqualification of immigrants and their descendants in the Norwegian labor market by Birkelund, Gunn E. et al.
www.ssoar.info
Perfect for the job? Overqualification of immigrants
and their descendants in the Norwegian labor
market
Birkelund, Gunn E.; Larsen, Edvard N.; Rogne, Adrian F.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Birkelund, G. E., Larsen, E. N., & Rogne, A. F. (2018). Perfect for the job? Overqualification of immigrants and their
descendants in the Norwegian labor market. Social Inclusion, 6(3), 78-103. https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v6i3.1451
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-58278-2
Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 78–103
DOI: 10.17645/si.v6i3.1451
Article
Perfect for the Job? Overqualification of Immigrants and their
Descendants in the Norwegian Labor Market
Edvard N. Larsen *, Adrian F. Rogne and Gunn E. Birkelund
Department of Sociology andHumanGeography, University of Oslo, 0317Oslo, Norway; E-Mails: e.n.larsen@sosgeo.uio.no
(E.N.L.), a.f.rogne@sosgeo.uio.no (A.F.R.), g.e.birkelund@sosgeo.uio.no (G.E.B.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 28 February 2018 | Accepted: 30 May 2018 | Published: 30 July 2018
Abstract
Compared to the majority population, studies have shown that non-western immigrants are more likely to work in jobs
for which they are overqualified. These findings are based on coarse measures of jobs, and an important question is how
sensitive these findings are to the definition of jobs. By using detailed information from Norwegian register data 2014, we
provide a methodological innovation in comparing individuals working in the same occupation, industry, sector, firm, and
municipality. In this way, we measure the degree of overqualification among workers within more than 653,000 jobs. We
differentiate between immigrants and their descendants originating from Western Europe, the New EU countries, other
Western countries, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Africa and Asia (except MENA countries), and South and
Central America, and compare their outcomes with the majority population holding the same jobs. We find that immi-
grants from all country of origin groups are more likely to be overqualified compared to the majority population and to
descendants of immigrants. However, the prevalence of overqualification decreases with time since immigration.
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1. Introduction
Overqualification refers to a mismatch between the re-
quired qualifications for a given job, or the general edu-
cational level of individuals holding a job, and the qualifi-
cations held by the individual job occupant. Economies
characterized by mismatches in the labor market are
less efficient and productive, as human capital is un-
derutilized. In addition to being harmful from a macro-
economic perspective, overqualification is associated
with lower economic returns to human capital for the in-
dividuals in question. The successful utilization of human
capital is perhaps of particular interest in the context of
migration: compared to the majority population, immi-
grants inWestern countries are not onlymore likely to be
unemployed, but also more likely to hold jobs for which
they are overqualified (Green, Kler, & Leeves, 2007; Lind-
ley, 2009; OECD, 2008). Such systematic differences in
overqualification between immigrants and the majority
may result from various mechanisms, such as discrimina-
tion, lack of recognition of qualifications obtained in for-
eign countries, or differences in access to informal net-
works and employment opportunities.
In this study, we provide a thorough analysis of
overqualification among immigrants and descendants of
immigrants in Norway. By using Norwegian registry data
from 2014, we provide a fine-grained overview of rel-
ative overqualification among immigrants and descen-
dants from different regions of origin. We use different
measurements of relative overqualification (the mean,
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modal, andmedian approach) at different levels of detail
ranging from coarse job definitions (commonly used in
the literature), to very detailed job categories. This is mo-
tivated by the possibility that coarse job definitions, such
as simple ISCO-codes, may bias estimates of overqualifi-
cation due to heterogeneous occupational positions be-
ing treated as identical. We compare people working in
the same occupation, sector, industry, firm, and munic-
ipality, resulting in more than 653,000 unique jobs. To
the best of our knowledge, an approach with this level
of detail has never been used before. The methodologi-
cal contribution of this article is thus twofold: we investi-
gate whether group differences in relative overqualifica-
tion persist when comparing individuals in nearly identi-
cal occupational positions, and whether the results are
influenced by the choice of measurement.
We seek to investigate three main research ques-
tions: are immigrants and descendants from different
countries of origin more or less likely to be overqualified,
compared to majority Norwegians? How do these differ-
ences vary with method for assessing overqualification
or definition of jobs? How do these differences vary be-
tween gender, sectors, time since immigration, and edu-
cational level?
2. Background
There is a growing strand of literature showing that the
marginal returns to education tend to be lower for im-
migrants than the majority (Bratsberg & Terrell, 2002;
Chiswick &Miller, 2008; Lindley, 2009). A potential mech-
anism explaining these differences might be that immi-
grants are more likely to be overqualified for their jobs.
This is indeed the partial conclusion of studies conducted
in Norway: Hardoy and Schøne (2014) find that a sub-
stantial part of the difference in returns to education
among non-western immigrants and the majority can
be attributed to a higher prevalence of overqualification
among immigrants. Villund (2010, 2014) has also docu-
mented a higher prevalence of overqualification among
immigrants than the majority in Norway, and several
studies have documented that immigrants in Norway are
more likely than the majority population to be unem-
ployed, in particular immigrants fromnon-Western coun-
tries (e.g., Bratsberg, Raaum, & Røed, 2014).
Potential causes of overqualification among immi-
grants could be related to lack of relevant work expe-
rience in the host country, problems with recognition
of skills obtained before migration, and language pro-
ficiency issues (Duvander, 2001). Even when formally
recognized, immigrants’ pre-immigration education and
work experience might be less valued in their new coun-
try of residence (Zeng & Xie, 2004), particularly if em-
ployers are queuing the job applicants by their poten-
tial productivity (Weiss, 1980). Immigrants might also
lack country-specific skills that could affect their employ-
ment opportunities and their likelihood to get jobs they
are formally qualified for. An Australian study showed
that immigrants who have been overqualified in their
country of origin were more likely to be overqualified in
their new country of residence (Piracha, Tani, & Vadean,
2012). Additionally, immigrants with different reasons
for migration might have strongly differing opportunities
regarding employment: those who potentially face re-
migration might not be able to turn down jobs for which
they are overqualified, in contrast tomajority candidates.
None of the mechanisms discussed so far, however, ap-
ply to descendants of immigrants, who, for themost part,
have domestic education and work experience.
A group of mechanisms that may explain relative
overqualification revolve around employer preferences
and behavior. Ethnic discrimination, both of first- and
second-generation of immigrant descent, has been doc-
umented through experimental studies (for overviews
see OECD, 2013; Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016; for Nor-
wegian studies see Birkelund, Chan, Ugreninov, Midt-
bøen, & Rogstad, 2018; Birkelund, Heggebø, & Rogstad,
2017; Midtbøen, 2016). When hired, minority candi-
dates might need stronger qualifications to be consid-
ered on an equal footing with majority candidates, re-
sulting in overqualification. Conversely, anticipating dis-
crimination, ethnicminoritiesmight seek jobswith lower
formal requirements. Finally, network effects, informa-
tion channels, and local labor market differences could
also produce gaps in the incidence of overqualification
between immigrants and the majority population.
There are potentially severe consequences of system-
atic overqualification. As mentioned, overqualification
implies lower returns to education. In addition, the re-
turns to excess education are lower than the returns to
required education (i.e., Alba-Ramirez, 1993; Duncan &
Hoffman, 1981; Lindley, 2009; Nielsen, 2011; Rumberger,
1987). However, less is known about the long-term ef-
fects of initial labor market overqualification: having held
positions beneath their skill level might present an em-
ployee as lacking in motivation or ambition to prospec-
tive employers, even if the initial overqualification was
the result of external obstacles such as ethnic discrimi-
nation. Following this logic, systematic overqualification
might lead to long-term stigma or cumulative disadvan-
tage. Finally, it is in the interest of policy makers to limit
overqualification because it leads to less effective use of
skills, and a “productivity shortfall” (i.e., Barrett, Bergin, &
Duffy, 2006; Green et al., 2007). Highly educated individu-
als employed in positions where their human capital goes
underutilized thus leads to a net loss of overall potential
productivity. This topic is of particular relevance for pol-
icy makers in the context of immigration, where the uti-
lization of immigrants’ skills is considered to be crucial.
In this article, we aim to provide a thorough and de-
tailed descriptive overview of relative overqualification
in Norway that can serve as comparison for studies in
other national contexts, as well as a basis for further
studies, by assessing the relevance of methods, hetero-
geneity between immigrant groups, and heterogeneity
within jobs.
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3. Data and Methods
3.1. Data
We rely on high-quality register data from Norwegian
administrative registers, provided by Statistics Norway.
These data contain demographic information on indi-
viduals (age, gender, country of origin, immigrant back-
ground etc.), aswell as information on education and em-
ployment relations. The employment data provide infor-
mation on every individual registered as working at least
one hour in the reference week (in November), or who
were temporarily absent from work.
The Norwegian-born majority is our reference group.
Immigrants are defined as those who are born with two
foreign-born parents to a mother not registered as res-
ident in Norway at the time of birth. Descendants are
defined as Norwegian-born with two foreign-born par-
ents, the majority being those born in Norway with two
Norwegian-born parents. We differentiate between im-
migrants and second-generation descendants originat-
ing from Western Europe, the New EU countries, other
Western countries, MENA, South and Central America,
Africa and Asia (except MENA countries). All others are
placed in a residual category of “others” (e.g., individu-
als born abroad to two Norwegian-born parents). For de-
scendants, the mother’s country background is used if
the parents have different country backgrounds.
The Norwegian educational registers include infor-
mation on all education undertaken in Norway and for-
mally approved education from abroad. However, for im-
migrants, the register information might be incomplete.
For instance, immigrantswith higher educationmayhave
stronger incentives to apply to get their foreign educa-
tion approved by the Norwegian authorities and are thus
more likely to register their educational level than immi-
grants with lower education are. If this is the case, our
estimates of overqualification among immigrants might
be upward-biased due to listwise deletion of individuals
with no recorded educational level. The opposite would
be true in the inverse case. To investigate this, we ran
our main models twice, first we listwise deleted all in-
dividuals with missing educational information; second,
we grouped these individuals with thosewho have no ed-
ucation or pre-school education (see Table A1 in the An-
nex). The latter approach should yield a conservative es-
timate of overqualification in groupswheremany individ-
uals lack educational information, and large differences
in the results from the two approaches would indicate
that our data are biased due to a skewed distribution of
missing educational levels. The results from the two ap-
proaches were almost identical. Thus, we are confident
that this potential bias is not a major issue. However, the
analyses in this article build on the second, more conser-
vative approach.
Our sample includes all individuals between 25 and
64 years of age registered as resident in Norway in 2014,
with a valid immigrant background indicator. From the
employment data, we condition on having a non-missing
indicator of whether the employment relation is the
main employment relation, and having a non-missing oc-
cupational code, sector code, firm/organizational iden-
tification code (“business number”), and municipality
of employment. To determine the modal, median, and
mean education within each job (see Section 3.2 below),
we use the education of all individuals who hold that job.
Thus, individuals withmultiple employment relations are
included in the measurement of educational levels in
all of their jobs. However, when assessing the relative
overqualification of each individual, we use themain em-
ployment relation for these individuals. Finally, we condi-
tion on a successful merging of the data on demograph-
ics, education and employment, and not being currently
enrolled in education. By conditioning on a successful
merge with the employment data, we condition on be-
ing employed in the reference week. Our final samples
differ somewhat between job definitions when using the
modal approach. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for
the mean approach at the most detailed job definition.
Descriptive statistics for the other samples are provided
in Table A2.
3.2. Measuring Overqualification
There are at least three commonly usedmethods of oper-
ationalizing and measuring overqualification: job analy-
sis, worker self-assessment, and realized matches (for an
overview see Hartog, 2000). We have opted for the lat-
ter approach for this study. We use occupational data to
map the distribution of qualifications among all individ-
uals holding the same job as the individual in question.
Using realized matches allows us to look at relative dif-
ferences between groups even in cases where jobs have
little or no formal requirements, or in cases where the
same position in different sectors, industries, or firms
have different actual skill distributions. In occupations
where almost all employees exceed the formal require-
ments, there might still be systematic group differences
in the de facto qualification distributions, which would
not be identifiable with an approach based on job anal-
ysis. Thus, we argue that realized matches provide the
best grounds for comparing inequalities in overqualifica-
tion as an outcome. This strategy is, however, unsuited
as an overall evaluation of the degree of qualification
mismatch in the Norwegian labor market. Therefore, our
results should be interpreted as measurements of rel-
ative, rather than absolute overqualification. Previous
studies of overqualification using Norwegian data have
employed all three measurements: Villund (2014) using
job analysis, Støren&Wiers-Jenssen (2010) and Brynin &
Longhi (2009) using worker self-assessment, and Hardoy
& Schøne (2014) using realized matches. Our results are
thus only comparable with the latter.
We employ three methods to measure relative
overqualification. First, we calculate the modal level of
education for employees in each job using five ordinal
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educational levels (see Table A1 in the Annex). We de-
fine individuals as overqualified if their educational level
is one or more levels higher than the modal education
among individuals in the same job.1 Second, we use the
mean length of education (in years) held by individuals
in the same job (Verdugo & Verdugo, 1989). Length of
education (based on educational level, not actual time
spent in education) approximately corresponds to the
standard grade level of the NUS2000 educational codes.
In this approach, an individual is overqualified if his/her
education ismore than one standard deviation above the
job mean. As noted by Dolton & Vignoles (2000, p. 180)
the cutoff of one standard deviation is entirely arbitrary,
yet we are primarily interested in the relative positions
of different groups in the skill distributions of jobs, and
do not see this as a problem, as we apply the same cut-
off to all groups. The cutoff at one standard deviation
above the mean is generally wider than the cutoff at
one level above the mode or median, implying that the
mean approach provides a more conservative estimate
of the prevalence of relative overqualification. Third, we
also measure the median level of education within each
job, based on the same 5-level classification as themodal
level. We define individuals as overqualified if their edu-
cational level is one or more levels higher than the me-
dian education among individuals in the same job.2
3.3. Defining a “Job”
How a “job” is defined is of major importance for the
assessment of relative overqualification. A coarse job
definition, using heterogeneous jobs such as “teacher”
or “secretary” may lead to an overestimation of the
level of overqualification if there is heterogeneity in
the educational requirements within the job. For in-
stance, “teacher” may encompass a variety of occupa-
tions such as “preschool teacher”, “adjunct”, and “lec-
tor” associated with different levels of education. In this
case, if most teachers were adjuncts, all lectors would
be overqualified as teachers. If immigrant groups are un-
equally distributed on detailed occupational classifica-
tions, this may bias our estimates of relative overquali-
fication between these groups. In addition, despite hav-
ing the same occupational code, jobs may be heteroge-
neous in a number of other ways. First, firms in different
industries or sectors hiring people for the same occupa-
tions may select candidates differently or hire from dif-
ferent pools of applicants. Thus, we measure overqualifi-
cation within industries and sectors. Second, individual
firms within the same sector and industry may regard
the educational demands or the respective pools of ap-
plicants differently, also for jobs in the same occupation.
To avoid this issue, we also measure overqualification
within firms in the same industry and sector. Third, there
may be regional differences in hiring practices or appli-
cant pools, even within the same firm. For instance, if a
fast-food chain has two restaurants, one in a city, and one
in a rural area, the educational level and immigrant group
composition of individuals applying for similar jobs at the
two restaurants may vary greatly. To overcome this, we
also measure overqualification within firms within the
same municipalities.
In sum, differences in local labormarkets, job require-
ments, the educational level of job applicants, hiring
practices, rules and norms for advancement and promo-
tion, and numerous other sources of occupational het-
erogeneity may bias estimates of the total prevalence
of overqualification. If such systematic differences also
correlate with the proportion of individuals from differ-
ent immigrant groups within occupations, estimates of
group differences in relative overqualification will be bi-
ased. A key contribution of the present study is the use of
detailed information on occupations, which enables us
to define a “job” as a set of relatively homogenous em-
ployment relations. To ensure that jobs are as homoge-
nous as possible, we narrow down the definition of jobs
in a stepwise fashion. This allows us to assess overqual-
ification by comparing the education of each individual
to the educational composition of others in jobs that are
as similar as possible to their own while also exploring at
which level (occupation, industry, sector, firm, and mu-
nicipality) biasesmight occur due to occupational hetero-
geneity. It is important to acknowledge, however, that in-
creasing the occupational detail in measuring overqual-
ification potentially obscures important sources of eth-
nic disadvantage caused by occupational segregation. Im-
migrants and majority employees with equal qualifica-
tions might for instance hold substantially similar but for-
mally distinct job titles, where the latter group is advan-
taged due to e.g., ethnic discrimination. In the same way,
equally qualified immigrants might be stationed in cer-
tain branches of firms, thus not appearing to be relatively
overqualified in our analysis. Such differences are effec-
tively eliminated with our approach but remain poten-
tially important sources of inequality in reality.
The Norwegian register data contains 452 unique
broad occupational codes (4-digit) and 7073 unique nar-
row occupational codes (7-digit). We first utilize the en-
tire list of broad and narrow occupational codes and re-
gard each occupation as a unique job. Second, we uti-
lize the entire list of industries in the Norwegian register
data (780 industries) and define a job as the combina-
tion of occupational code and industry code. Third, to
account for job heterogeneity between sectors and in-
dustries we define jobs as a combination of occupation,
industry, and sector (24 institutional sectors). Fourth, to
compare individuals within firms we use firm identifica-
tion codes (there are 191,260 unique firms in our data).
1 If there is no modal level of education within a job, but two adjacent modal levels, we set the modal to the midpoint between the two. If the two or
more modal levels are not adjacent, we are unable to define a modal level and exclude the jobs from the analysis.
2 Some jobs have median levels of education that fall between two categories. In such cases, we require that individuals exceed the median by one level
or more to be considered as overqualified.
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 78–103 81
This should root out any firm-level differences in, for in-
stance, hiring practices. Finally, to account for any geo-
graphic differences in hiring practices and recruitment
pools within firmswe use data on themunicipality of em-
ployment and define a job as the combination of occupa-
tional code, industry, sector, firm, and municipality.
The total number of unique jobs according to these
job definitions is slightly lower for the modal than the
median and mean approach (see Table 1). At the most
detailed level, we operate with more than 653 thousand
unique jobs. This level of detailmay appear excessive, yet
we want to ensure that we compare individuals working
in jobs that are as similar as possible. Otherwise, wemay
run the risk of misinterpreting within-job heterogene-
ity as representing relative overqualification. If, however,
group differences in overqualification are not sensitive to
the level of detail in job definitions, this finding has im-
plications for studies investigating relative overqualifica-
tion in general. Detailed descriptive statistics on the num-
ber of people holding “identical” jobs by each method
and job definition are provided in the Annex, Table A3.
3.4. Predicting Overqualification
To assess differences in relative overqualification, we
need to account for differences in age structure between
the groups. Since our analyses of relative overqualifica-
tion are conditioned on access to employment, we also
include an analysis of the probability of being employed.
We do this by way of simple linear regressions with
fixed effects for age and dummies for immigrant groups
(with separate groups for first and second-generation
immigrants), where the outcome is a dummy indicat-
ing whether the individual is employed (Equation 1) or
overqualified (Equation 2). Apart from this, we take a par-
simonious approach to modeling, for two reasons. First,
we want to describe the prevalence of overqualification
in a transparent fashion, so we do not wish to clutter our
models with control variables. Second, we do not want
to run the risk of controlling for intermediate outcomes
(“bad controls”) which might bias our estimates. Immi-
grants are less likely to have higher educational levels,
such as a PhD or a master’s degree, which implies that
those who do are more strongly selected within their
group than themajority with similar educational levels is.
We do however not introduce any group specific weight-
ing procedures, yet in some of our analyses we introduce
controls for educational level (see below). Our models
are run separately for men and women, for eachmethod
(modal, median, and mean), for each job definition, and
for different subgroups, such as sectors, where this is
relevant. Note that running models separately by sub-
groups allows the age fixed effects to vary between sub-
groups. Results presented in graphs are predicted prob-
abilities for 25-year-olds, with 95% confidence intervals
from robust standard errors.
p( 􏷿employed)i = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × agei + 𝛽2
× immigrant background groupi
(1)
p( 􏷿over qualified)i = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × agei + 𝛽2
× immigrant background groupi
(2)
Note that themethod for assessing overqualification and
the definition of jobs is not part of the models by way of
fixed effects or similar approaches. They are only used
to code the outcome variable in Equation 2. We also pro-
videmodels including information on time since immigra-
tion for the immigrant groups. These models are based
on Equation 2 but split the indicator dummies for immi-
grants from each group into three dummies each, indi-
cating a time since immigration of 0–5, 6–10, and 11+
years, respectively. Similarly, we provide models where
each immigrant group is split by educational level. In the
Annexwe also includemodels controlling for educational
level, educational level by field, and reason for immigra-
tion (see Tables A5 and A6).
3.5. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our main sample,
when defining a job as the combination of occupation,
industry, sector, firm, and municipality, and using the
mean approach. For a full table of descriptive statistics
for all samples, see the Annex, Table A2. Our sample of
people aged 25–64 has a slight majority of women. The
mean age is about 44 years. At this detailed job defini-
tion, about 7% of our sample is considered overqualified.
Immigrants make up about 12% of the sample, while de-
scendants of immigrants make up less than a half per-
cent of the total sample. Relative to the total population
in the age group, immigrants are underrepresented in
our sample, mainly due to lower employment rates. It
is worth noting that very few individuals have no edu-
Table 1. Number of unique jobs by job definition and method for assessing overqualification.
Job definition Abbreviation Modal Median and mean
Occupation (broad, 4-digit) Oc. (broad) 425 426
Occupation (narrow, 7-digit) Oc. 6 638 6 772
Occupation x Industry Oc.xIn 114 290 118 604
Occupation x Industry x Sector Oc.xIn.xSe. 128 158 132 830
Occupation x Industry x Sector x Firm Oc.xIn.xSe.xFi. 628 924 641 710
Occupation x Industry x Sector x Firm x Municipality Oc.xIn.xSe.xFi.xMu 640 234 653 129
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Mean approach
OcXInXSeXFiXMu
Sample size 1 782 867
Women (%) 48,06
Mean age 43,82
Public sector employees (%) 34,67
Overqualified (%) 6,89
Immigrant background (%)
Norwegian-born majority 82,70
Immigrants total 12,24
Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 3,10
New EU countries Western 3,05
Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand 0,23
MENA *
Non-western
1,45
Asia ++ ** 3,37
Africa, excluding MENA 0,60
South and Central America 0,44
Second generation total 0,46
Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 0,10
New EU countries Western 0,03
Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand 0,01
MENA*
Non-western
0,16
Asia ++ ** 0,14
Africa, excluding MENA 0,01
South and Central America 0,01
Others 4,60
Educational level (%)
No education, pre-school or missing 0,30
Primary 0,27
Lower secondary 14,56
Upper secondary basic 8,10
Upper secondary, final year 30,90
Post-secondary, non-tertiary 3,85
First stage of tertiary, undergraduate 29,52
First stage of tertiary, graduate 11,24
Second stage of tertiary, postgraduate 1,25
Notes: * Includes Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen; ** Includes Asia (ex-
cluding MENA countries), Eastern European non-EU countries, and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
cation, only pre-school education, or missing education,
whereas more than 40% of the sample have tertiary ed-
ucation or higher. Comparing Table 2 with Table A2, we
note that the mean approach is the most conservative,
providing the lowest levels of overqualification. Descrip-
tive statistics by immigrant background groups are pro-
vided in the Annex (Table A4).
4. Results
Before we address overqualification, we look at differ-
ences in employment for different immigrant and de-
scendant groups, compared to the majority. This analy-
sis is carried out in part to provide an overview of the se-
lection into employment, which we condition on in our
main analyses. Table 3 contains the results from estimat-
ing the probability of being employed (Equation 1) by
gender, using linear probability models with age fixed ef-
fects. As can be seen, all immigrant groups have a lower
probability of being employed than the majority (our ref-
erence group) in the referenceweek. For immigrantmen,
the difference varies between 3% (Western Europe) to
29% (MENA countries). For women, the largest differ-
ences are found for immigrants from MENA countries
(46%) and Africa (27%). For most second-generation de-
scendants, the employment gaps are smaller than for im-
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Table 3. Differences in employment by immigrant background group and gender. OLS with age fixed effects.
Men Women
Coefficient P Coefficient P
Immigrant group [ref: Norwegian-born majority]
Immigrants Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) −0,0280 0,0000 −0,0113 0,0000
Second generation Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) −0,0186 0,0606 −0,0456 0,0001
Immigrants New EU countries −0,0878 0,0000 −0,1006 0,0000
Second generation New EU countries −0,0562 0,0019 −0,0617 0,0019
Immigrants Canada, USA, Australia, NZ −0,0584 0,0000 −0,1201 0,0000
Second generation Canada, USA, Australia, NZ −0,0333 0,3957 −0,0415 0,3407
Immigrants MENA −0,2929 0,0000 −0,4618 0,0000
Second generation MENA −0,1262 0,0000 −0,1424 0,0000
Immigrants Asia −0,1291 0,0000 −0,1680 0,0000
Second generation Asia −0,0617 0,0000 −0,0484 0,0000
Immigrants Africa, excluding MENA −0,2419 0,0000 −0,2714 0,0000
Second generation Africa, excluding MENA −0,1184 0,0002 −0,0754 0,0222
Immigrants South and Central America −0,1122 0,0000 −0,1775 0,0000
Second generation South and Central America −0,1658 0,0000 −0,1349 0,0001
Others −0,0375 0,0000 −0,0282 0,0000
Constant 0,8181 0,0000 0,7944 0,0000
Age FE yes yes
R2 0,0519 0,0830
N 1358362 1296589
migrants, whereas we find no significant gaps in employ-
ment probabilities for descendants fromWestern Europe
(men only) and Canada, USA, Australia, and New Zealand.
These findings are in line with earlier studies (Bratsberg,
Raaum, & Røed, 2014, 2018), and may be driven by a
number of factors, such as variation in educational sys-
tems and the recognition of foreign degrees, cultural dis-
tances and language skills, reasons formigration, and the
fact that immigrants frommany countries have relatively
low education.
We now turn to our analysis of overqualification by
estimating Equation 2, separately for men and women.
In Table 4, we show results for the mean approach ap-
plied at the most detailed job definition. As can be seen,
all immigrants are more likely to be overqualified than
themajority, whereas the differences are not statistically
significant for the descendants. These findings are in line
with previous studies using less detailed job classifica-
tions (E.g., Villund, 2014; Hardoy & Schøne, 2014).
4.1. Predicted Overqualification by Method and Job
Definition
In order to assess the sensitivity of our estimates of the
prevalence of overqualification to the choice of method
(modal, median, and mean) and to assess the impact
of our detailed job definition, we estimate 36 mod-
els separately—one for each combination of method,
job definition, and gender. In order to ease presenta-
tion, we categorize immigrants and descendants into
western/non-western origin groups. The results are pro-
vided in Figure 1. As expected, the more detailed def-
inition of jobs provides the lowest estimates of the
overall prevalence of overqualification. We also note,
as expected, that the mean approach is more conser-
vative than the modal and median approaches. Yet, all
models show the same overall pattern: regardless of
job definition and method,3 immigrants are consistently
more likely to be overqualified than the majority and
second-generation descendants. In the following, we
use our most conservative estimates of the prevalence
of overqualification, namely the mean approach at the
most detailed job definition.
4.2. Differences Between Countries of Origin and Sectors
To provide a more detailed assessment of overqualifi-
cation, we divide our sample into 16 groups consist-
ing of immigrants from seven countries/regions of ori-
gin, descendants of immigrants from these same groups,
Norwegian-born majority, and a heterogeneous group
of “others”. All analyses are shown separately by gender
and public/private sector. We use a strict definition of
public sector, implying that government or municipality-
owned enterprises are counted in the private sector. Due
to more formalized hiring processes and a higher degree
of legal requirements in the public sector, we expect a
lower prevalence of overqualification in this sector com-
pared to the private sector (Heath & Yu, 2005). If the
sheltering hypothesis in public sector holds, we should
3 This is in line with Hardoy and Schøne (2014), who, using the mean and modal approach, find that the choice of measurement has little impact on the
overall results.
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Table 4. Differences in overqualification by immigrant background group and gender. Jobs are defined as the combination
of occupation, industry, sector, firm and municipality. Overqualification is defined by the mean approach. OLS with age
fixed effects.
Men Women
Coefficient P Coefficient P
Immigrant group [ref: Norwegian-born majority]
Immigrants Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 0,0689 0,0000 0,0630 0,0000
Second generation Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 0,0071 0,5117 0,0214 0,0594
Immigrants New EU countries 0,1041 0,0000 0,1969 0,0000
Second generation New EU countries 0,0014 0,9375 0,0223 0,2514
Immigrants Canada, USA, Australia, NZ 0,1115 0,0000 0,1439 0,0000
Second generation Canada, USA, Australia, NZ −0,0072 0,8226 0,0568 0,2096
Immigrants MENA 0,0651 0,0000 0,0266 0,0000
Second generation MENA 0,0037 0,6659 0,0012 0,8916
Immigrants Asia 0,0778 0,0000 0,1138 0,0000
Second generation Asia 0,0067 0,4613 0,0172 0,0852
Immigrants Africa, excluding MENA 0,0984 0,0000 0,0270 0,0000
Second generation Africa, excluding MENA 0,0766 0,0599 0,0656 0,0910
Immigrants South and Central America 0,1156 0,0000 0,1311 0,0000
Second generation South and Central America −0,0187 0,4900 −0,0042 0,8968
Others 0,0125 0,0000 0,0122 0,0000
Constant 0,0814 0,0000 0,1004 0,0000
Age FE yes yes
R2 0,0133 0,0300
N 704 450 693 901
Figure 1. Predicted overqualification among non-western immigrants, non-western second generation, western immi-
grants, western second generation, others, and the majority. 36 models estimated with age fixed effects. Note: Non-
western (NW) countries include the country groupsMENA, Asia++, Africa excludingMENA and South and Central America.
also expect to find smaller gaps in overqualification be-
tween themajority and immigrant population in the pub-
lic sector.
Figure 2 shows results based on the mean approach
at the most detailed job definition. Each box in this fig-
ure presents results from a separate model, based on
equation 2. To ease comparison, a horizontal line rep-
resents the predicted values for the majority. Overall,
levels of overqualification do not differ dramatically be-
tween the majority and second-generation descendants
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 78–103 85
Figure 2. Predicted overqualification among immigrants and the second generation from seven country-of-origin groups
and others, compared to the majority, by sector. Note: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects.
of immigrants and in the cases where such differences
are marked, the confidence intervals are wide. However,
immigrants from all countries of origin are more likely to
be overqualified than themajority in both the public and
the private sector. The only exceptions are for women
from MENA-countries and Africa. The fact that it is diffi-
cult to discern any substantial differences between sec-
tors suggests thatwhen it comes to overqualification, the
public sector does not play a sheltering role. The compar-
atively low prevalence of overqualification among immi-
grant women from MENA countries and Africa may be
related to the relatively low levels of education in these
groups, and/or their lower employment rates.
4.3. Overqualification by Time Since Immigration
By further subdividing the groups of immigrants by num-
ber of years since they immigrated, a clear pattern
emerges. Figure 3 displays results for the most detailed
job definition by immigrant background, where immi-
grants are divided into groups by time since their (first)
immigration; 0–5, 6–10, and 11+ years. Overall, em-
ployed immigrants who have lived in the country for a
shorter time aremost likely to be overqualified, and,with
a few exceptions, the prevalence of overqualification
monotonically falls with time since immigration, nearly
closing the gap to the descendants and the majority.
Differences between public and private sectors are not
large, and the main patterns are roughly similar for men
and women. The main finding here is also in line with
previous empirical studies in several Western European
labor markets (i.e., Nielsen, 2011).
4.4. Overqualification by Educational Levels
As discussed above, differences in predicted overqual-
ification between immigrant groups might be related
to differences in education. We therefore re-ran the
previous models—see Figure 3—with each group sub-
divided by educational level. We present the results by
educational level within each gender and sector group.
More precisely, the first and second box of each row
displays estimates from the same model, whereas the
third and fourth box displays estimates from a second
model. Since, by definition, no individuals at the low-
est educational level (no schooling, primary or lower
secondary schooling, or missing information) can be
overqualified, and since very few individuals with only
secondary schooling were overqualified, the results for
these groups are omitted in the figures (although they
are included in the models). Since very few individuals
have completed postgraduate education, and we risk
identifying individuals in small immigrant groups, the
postgraduate group is merged with the graduates (this
choice has little impact on the results). Thus, Figure 4
shows results for the two highest educational groups
(graduate and postgraduate). Note that the procedure
for assigning overqualification to each individual still dis-
tinguishes between all educational levels.
As shown in these graphs, immigrants are more of-
ten overqualified than the majority at both graduate
and postgraduate levels. We also note than the general
prevalence of overqualification is higher at the postgrad-
uate level. The gaps aremore pronounced for immigrants
from the new EU countries in the private sector, and
for immigrants from Asia, Africa, and South and Central
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Figure 3. Predicted overqualification among immigrants, by time since immigration and seven country-of-origin groups, the
second generation from seven country-of-origin groups, and others, compared to the majority. Note: 4 models estimated
with age fixed effects.
America in the public sector (with high numbers also evi-
dent for female graduates from new EU countries). How-
ever, it is worth noting the wide confidence intervals
for some of the descendant groups, and that the high
predicted prevalence of overqualification among male
African descendant graduates and postgraduates in the
private sector represents a small number of individuals.
4.5. Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses
Since we compare individuals within jobs, an individual
cannot be overqualified if he or she is the only individual
holding that job. This especially becomes an issue when
we compare individuals working in the same occupation,
industry, sector, firm, and municipality. To test the sen-
sitivity of our approach, we have run the models shown
in Figure 2 again, this time excluding all individuals work-
ing in jobs with fewer than 10 people. Results from these
analyses are included as Annex (Figure A1). The results
are roughly similar to those in Figure 2, implying that this
is not a major concern.
Our results may be particularly sensitive to group dif-
ferences in educational levels and fields of education. Al-
though the aim of this study is to describe, rather than
explain group differences in the prevalence of overqual-
ification, an analysis including controls for educational
level would be informative regarding such differences
among people with similar educational levels. As such,
wehave included analyses identical to those presented in
Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 1, 2 and 3, but with control for
educational level (5 groups) and educational level x field
(286 groups) in the Annex, Tables A5 and A6, Figures A2
to A7. While the figures with educational controls only
plot regression coefficients, not predicted values, the
overall patterns tell the same story as our main results,
though with smaller coefficients: even when comparing
people with similar education, overqualification is more
common amongmost immigrant groups, and it falls with
time since immigration. The exceptions are immigrants
from Western Europe and Canada, USA, Australia and
New Zealand when we control for educational level x
field. We have also done similar analyses where individu-
als’ stated reason for immigration (work, family, refugee,
education, other reasons, a missing category, and a “not
relevant” category) are included as control variables (Ta-
bles A5 and A6, and Figures A8 to A11). These analyses
produced similar results.
5. Conclusions
The main objective of this study has been to provide
a thorough, descriptive overview of overqualification
among immigrants and their descendants in the Norwe-
gian labormarket. TheNorwegianwelfare state is charac-
terized by relatively high employment protection, which
compared to more liberal or conservative welfare states
could make it more difficult for immigrants to find jobs,
and possibly also more difficult to find relevant jobs,
given their qualifications. On the other hand, mismatch
in the labor market in terms of overqualification harms
firms, individuals and society at large, and these produc-
tivity considerations would be similar across most coun-
tries. Thus, we would expect that the main trends in this
article might be applicable to countries with relatively
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 78–103 87
Figure 4. Predicted overqualification among immigrants and the second generation from seven country-of-origin groups,
and others, compared to the majority, by educational level. Note: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects.
strong employment protection and an open and compet-
itive economy.
Our main contributions to the literature can be sum-
marized in threemain points. First, we compare three dif-
ferent measurements of relative overqualification, pro-
viding an assessment of the impact of the choice of
method. Second, by measuring jobs at a more detailed
level than in previous research, we address heterogene-
ity between jobs and compare individuals working in sim-
ilar jobs. Finally, by differentiating between immigrants
and descendants from different countries of origin, we
address heterogeneity between immigrant groups in the
prevalence of overqualification. Our findings show that,
in addition to having lower rates of employment, all im-
migrant groups are more likely to be overqualified than
the Norwegian-born majority. However, second genera-
tion descendants of immigrants are not more likely to be
overqualified than the majority.
Further, these differences vary little with method for
assessing overqualification. We have tested three meth-
ods, the mean, modal, and median approach and found
the results to be comparable. Group differences in rela-
tive overqualification between immigrants and the ma-
jority also persist even when using extremely detailed
job definitions. In other words, immigrants are more
likely to be overqualified compared to the majority, even
when comparing individuals in near identical occupa-
tional positions.
Relative differences in overqualification do not seem
to differ substantially by gender, nor by sector, weaken-
ing the hypothesis that the public sector plays a shel-
tering role. We also found that, while the prevalence
of overqualification is generally higher for immigrants
than for second-generation descendants and the major-
ity, these differences seem to diminish over time since
immigration. This can potentially be explained by differ-
ing reasons for migration for different groups, e.g., that
migrants that face potential re-migration are more likely
to accept jobs below their qualifications. However, it is
worth noting that we only use cross-sectional data, so
this pattern may be biased by systematic differences be-
tween immigrants from the same country origin groups
arriving in different periods. For descendants ofmigrants,
the prevalence of overqualification is generally compara-
ble to the level among the majority. We also found that,
while overall overqualification is higher among those
with higher education, the relative differences between
immigrants and the majority are still marked.
In further studies, we aim to dig deeper into the
relevant factors in mapping differences in overqualifi-
cation between minority groups and the majority. Of
particular relevance would be to differentiate between
pre- and post-immigration qualifications (see Friedberg,
2000). This is in part done by categorizing immigrants by
migration recency, but should still be taken into account
more precisely, as the (lack of) recognition of foreign edu-
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cation is likely a major hurdle to finding a suitable job for
educated immigrants. Using data for multiple years may
allow us to explore how initial overqualification might af-
fect the occupational trajectories of immigrants relative
to the majority, and to take into account time variation
in the composition of the immigrant flow.
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Annex
Table A1. Coding of educational levels and years of education.
Original coding of educational levels Recoded educational levels
and years of education
Level Level name ISCED Grade Years of Level of
2011 education education
0 No education and pre-school education 01/02 None 0
1 Primary education 1 1.–7. 7 1
2 Lower secondary education 2 8–10. 10
3 Upper secondary education, basic education 3/4 11.–12. 12
4 Upper secondary, final year 3/4 13. + 13 2
5 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 4/5 14. + 14
6 First stage of tertiary education, undergraduate level 6 14.–17. 17 3
7 First stage of tertiary education, graduate level 7 18.–19. 19 4
8 Second stage of tertiary education, postgraduate education 8 20. + 22 5
9 Unspecified (missing) 0 1
. [missing] 0 1
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics (full table)
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Sample size 1782865 1782291 1771263 1770672 1753872 1753646 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867 1782867
Women (%) 48,06 48,06 48,11 48,11 48,07 48,07 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06 48,06
Mean age 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,85 43,85 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82 43,82
Public sector employees (%) 34,67 34,67 34,84 34,85 34,90 34,90 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67 34,67
Overqualified (%) 20,75 16,70 14,36 14,09 8,80 8,69 18,14 15,59 13,77 13,59 9,06 8,98 12,60 10,53 9,79 9,72 6,96 6,89
Immigrant background (%)
Native majority 82,70 82,70 82,72 82,73 82,88 82,88 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70 82,70
Immigrants total 12,24 12,23 12,22 12,22 12,06 12,06 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24 12,24
Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 3,10 3,09 3,08 3,08 3,07 3,07 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10 3,10
New EU countries 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 2,99 2,99 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05 3,05
Canada, USA, Australia, NZ 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23
MENA * 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,43 1,43 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45
Asia ++ ** 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,32 3,32 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37 3,37
Africa, excluding MENA 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,59 0,59 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60
South and Central America 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,43 0,43 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44
Second generation total 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46
Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10
New EU countries 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
Canada, USA, Australia, NZ 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
MENA* 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16
Asia ++ ** 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14
Africa, excluding MENA 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
South and Central America 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Others 4,60 4,60 4,59 4,59 4,59 4,59 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60 4,60
Educational level (%)
No education, pre-school or missing 0,30 0,30 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30
Primary 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27
Lower secondary 14,56 14,56 14,53 14,52 14,39 14,39 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56
Upper secondary basic 8,10 8,10 8,12 8,12 8,16 8,16 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10 8,10
Upper secondary, final year 30,90 30,91 30,99 30,99 31,13 31,13 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90 30,90
Post-secondary, non-tertiary 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,86 3,86 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85
First stage of tertiary, undergraduate 29,52 29,52 29,53 29,54 29,55 29,55 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52 29,52
First stage of tertiary, graduate 11,24 11,24 11,17 11,16 11,11 11,11 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24 11,24
Second stage of tertiary, postgraduate 1,25 1,25 1,24 1,25 1,24 1,24 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25
Notes: * Includes Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen; ** Includes Asia (excluding MENA countries), Eastern European non-EU countries, and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand).
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics for jobs.
Mean and median method
Number of individuals working in the same job
	 	 Percentiles
Number Mean
of unique number of SD
jobs individuals individuals 1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
Oc_short 426 4185.13 10168.97 1 1 2 86 833 3932 11333 17018 60723
Oc 6772 263.27 1392.28 1 1 1 4 25 121 451 1011 3771
OcXIn 118604 15.03 203.13 1 1 1 1 2 5 17 38 195
OcXInXSe 132830 13.42 178.11 1 1 1 1 2 5 15 33 175
OcXInXSeXFi 641710 2.78 9.82 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 8 26
OcXInXSeXFiXMu 653129 2.73 8.70 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 8 25
Number of individuals working in the same job, weighted by number of individuals
	 Percentiles
Number Mean
of unique number of SD
jobs individuals individuals 1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
Oc_short 426 28835.52 30698.67 476 1460 2708 6984 16228 38172 76224 112330 112330
Oc 6772 7625.17 12345.69 19 87 180 587 2370 8084 17544 45672 45796
OcXIn 118604 2759.99 7248.78 1 3 6 35 256 1570 7049 17130 42233
OcXInXSe 132830 2376.84 6792.70 1 2 5 29 214 1358 5605 10433 41575
OcXInXSeXFi 641710 37.45 133.50 1 1 1 2 5 20 68 149 655
OcXInXSeXFiXMu 653129 30.47 95.26 1 1 1 2 5 19 62 130 492
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Table A3. (Cont.) Descriptive statistics for jobs.
Modal method
Number of individuals working in the same job
	 	 Percentiles
Number Mean
of unique number of SD
jobs individuals individuals 1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
Oc_short 425 4194.98 10178.92 1 1 2 92 840 3932 11333 17018 60723
Oc 6638 268.50 1405.78 1 1 1 5 26 127 465 1033 3774
OcXIn 114290 15.50 206.92 1 1 1 1 2 5 17 39 203
OcXInXSe 128158 13.82 181.31 1 1 1 1 2 5 15 35 182
OcXInXSeXFi 628924 2.79 9.91 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 8 26
OcXInXSeXFiXMu 640234 2.74 8.79 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 8 26
Number of individuals working in the same job, weighted by number of individuals
	 Percentiles
Number Mean
of unique number of SD
jobs individuals individuals 1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
Oc_short 425 28835.56 30698.76 476 1460 2708 6984 16228 38172 76224 112330 112330
Oc 6638 7627.62 12346.95 20 87 180 589 2375 8084 17544 45672 45796
OcXIn 114290 2778.04 7269.04 1 3 7 36 262 1587 7049 17130 42233
OcXInXSe 128158 2393.19 6813.19 1 2 6 31 222 1372 5605 10433 41575
OcXInXSeXFi 628924 38.02 134.52 1 1 1 2 6 21 69 152 680
OcXInXSeXFiXMu 640234 30.92 95.98 1 1 1 2 5 20 64 134 492
Notes: These numbers pertain to the main employment relation of individuals in our sample. When coding our outcome variable (relative overqualification), we used all employment relations. For numbers
labeled “Number of individuals working in the same job”, we take jobs as the unit of analysis and provide statistics for the distribution of people in these jobs. Numbers labeled “Number of individuals
working in the same job, weighted by number of individuals” use the number of individuals that hold the same job as weights. At the most detailed job definition, these figures show that the majority of
jobs have only one person working in them, but the majority of people work in jobs that are held by more than one person.
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Table A4. Descriptive statistics by immigrant background.
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N 1474443 81996 55185 1770 54443 616 4185 141 25822 2844 60037 2491 10665 193 7838 198
Sample % 82,70 4,60 3,10 0,10 3,05 0,03 0,23 0,01 1,45 0,16 3,37 0,14 0,60 0,01 0,44 0,01
Mean age 44,47 42,23 43,10 43,33 38,12 40,98 43,32 49,29 39,00 30,61 40,37 30,56 39,42 31,07 41,43 30,37
% Women 48,28 48,45 44,27 46,72 38,32 48,05 44,61 46,81 35,04 47,75 59,73 48,01 45,34 50,78 56,32 48,48
% Public sector 35,68 34,32 30,59 31,81 13,84 29,71 28,32 43,26 30,57 31,68 34,43 27,18 42,04 32,12 34,55 25,76
% Overqualified 5,73 6,98 11,28 6,72 18,71 7,14 16,13 7,09 11,32 8,12 15,21 8,63 13,30 14,51 17,30 6,57
Educational level (%)
No education, pre-school or missing 0,04 0,11 1,66 0,11 0,99 0,00 1,79 0,00 4,66 0,77 2,11 0,16 3,08 0,00 2,49 0,51
Primary 0,00 0,01 0,41 0,00 0,22 0,00 0,17 0,00 5,68 0,00 4,06 0,08 4,65 0,00 1,02 0,00
Lower secondary 14,09 12,87 11,12 14,58 12,65 17,05 5,35 11,35 31,59 25,77 22,96 18,83 29,03 18,13 18,42 26,26
Upper secondary basic 8,90 5,34 5,84 7,29 3,52 6,49 1,98 10,64 2,61 0,98 3,57 0,80 2,58 0,00 3,05 1,52
Upper secondary, final year 31,60 27,12 21,62 27,40 42,53 26,46 11,76 21,28 20,58 28,94 24,92 26,50 24,94 24,87 26,24 33,84
Post-secondary, non-tertiary 4,26 3,84 0,98 3,11 0,70 4,55 1,15 3,55 1,46 2,07 1,37 2,01 1,82 1,55 1,76 2,53
First stage of tertiary, undergraduate 29,84 33,00 33,05 30,34 22,38 26,95 38,57 35,46 21,61 23,70 25,03 30,59 21,13 39,38 25,59 26,77
First stage of tertiary, graduate 10,36 16,12 18,99 15,14 15,15 17,53 28,94 12,77 9,95 17,33 13,17 20,43 10,69 15,54 18,01 8,59
Second stage of tertiary, postgraduate 0,91 1,60 6,32 2,03 1,86 0,97 10,30 4,96 1,87 0,42 2,82 0,60 2,08 0,52 3,41 0,00
Notes: * Includes Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen; ** Includes Asia (excluding MENA countries), Eastern European non-EU countries, and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand).
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Figure A1. Predicted overqualification among immigrants and the second generation from seven countries of origin and
others, compared to the native majority. Notes: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects. Excluding jobs shared by less
than 10 individuals.
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Table A5. Differences in employment by immigrant background group and gender. OLS with age fixed effects and controls for educational level (5 levels), educational level x field (286
groups) and stated reason for immigration (work, family, refugee, education, other reasons, a missing category, and a “not relevant” category).
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
	 	 Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P
Immigrant group [ref: Natives]
Immigrants Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) −0.0280 0.0000 −0.0113 0.0000 −0.0147 0.0000 −0.0174 0.0000 0.0184 0.0000 0.0104 0.0000 −0.0487 0.0000 −0.0127 0.0000
Second generation Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) −0.0186 0.0606 −0.0456 0.0001 −0.0174 0.0683 −0.0438 0.0001 −0.0112 0.2370 −0.0356 0.0013 −0.0186 0.0610 −0.0456 0.0001
Immigrants New EU countries −0.0878 0.0000 −0.1006 0.0000 −0.0437 0.0000 −0.0825 0.0000 0.0026 0.2733 −0.0309 0.0000 −0.1246 0.0000 −0.0813 0.0000
Second generation New EU countries −0.0562 0.0019 −0.0617 0.0019 −0.0605 0.0008 −0.0587 0.0029 −0.0531 0.0030 −0.0533 0.0065 −0.0562 0.0020 −0.0617 0.0019
Immigrants Canada, USA, Australia, NZ −0.0584 0.0000 −0.1201 0.0000 −0.0771 0.0000 −0.1393 0.0000 −0.0301 0.0000 −0.0914 0.0000 −0.0786 0.0000 −0.0859 0.0000
Second generation Canada, USA, Australia, NZ −0.0333 0.3957 −0.0415 0.3407 −0.0352 0.3654 −0.0614 0.1390 −0.0218 0.5703 −0.0511 0.2162 −0.0335 0.3937 −0.0411 0.3446
Immigrants MENA * −0.2929 0.0000 −0.4618 0.0000 −0.2370 0.0000 −0.3322 0.0000 −0.2069 0.0000 −0.2964 0.0000 −0.2412 0.0000 −0.3840 0.0000
Second generation MENA * −0.1262 0.0000 −0.1424 0.0000 −0.0906 0.0000 −0.1101 0.0000 −0.0794 0.0000 −0.1058 0.0000 −0.1259 0.0000 −0.1422 0.0000
Immigrants Asia ++ ** −0.1291 0.0000 −0.1680 0.0000 −0.1058 0.0000 −0.1071 0.0000 −0.0795 0.0000 −0.0745 0.0000 −0.1093 0.0000 −0.1051 0.0000
Second generation Asia ++ ** −0.0617 0.0000 −0.0484 0.0000 −0.0537 0.0000 −0.0415 0.0000 −0.0468 0.0000 −0.0382 0.0000 −0.0615 0.0000 −0.0480 0.0000
Immigrants Africa, excluding MENA −0.2419 0.0000 −0.2714 0.0000 −0.1934 0.0000 −0.1593 0.0000 −0.1632 0.0000 −0.1320 0.0000 −0.1923 0.0000 −0.1872 0.0000
Second generation Africa, excluding MENA −0.1184 0.0002 −0.0754 0.0222 −0.1125 0.0004 −0.0911 0.0046 −0.1063 0.0009 −0.0850 0.0079 −0.1183 0.0002 −0.0751 0.0228
Immigrants South and Central America −0.1122 0.0000 −0.1775 0.0000 −0.1015 0.0000 −0.1314 0.0000 −0.0712 0.0000 −0.0989 0.0000 −0.1226 0.0000 −0.1288 0.0000
Second generation South and central America −0.1658 0.0000 −0.1349 0.0001 −0.1365 0.0000 −0.0976 0.0049 −0.1205 0.0002 −0.0888 0.0100 −0.1657 0.0000 −0.1345 0.0001
Others −0.0375 0.0000 −0.0282 0.0000 −0.0428 0.0000 −0.0352 0.0000 −0.0367 0.0000 −0.0305 0.0000 −0.0374 0.0000 −0.0283 0.0000
Constant 0.8181 0.0000 0.7944 0.0000 0.6764 0.0000 0.6003 0.0000 0.5687 0.0000 0.4501 0.0000 0.8185 0.0000 0.7938 0.0000
Age FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Educational level controls yes yes
Educational level x field controls yes yes
Reason for immigration controls yes yes
R2 0.0519 0.0830 0.0969 0.1314 0.1066 0.1416 0.0542 0.0851
N 1358362 1296589 1296602 1260613 1292248 1256177 1358362 1296589
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Table A6. Differences in overqualification by immigrant background group and gender. Jobs are defined as the combination of occupation, industry, sector, firm, and municipality.
Overqualification is defined by the mean approach. OLS with age fixed effects and controls for educational level (5 levels) educational level x field (286 groups) and stated reason for
immigration (work, family, refugee, education, other reasons, a missing category, and a “not relevant” category).
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
	 	 Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P
Immigrant group [ref: Natives]
Immigrants Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 0,0689 0,0000 0,0630 0,0000 0,0277 0,0000 0,0283 0,0000 −0,0056 0,0155 −0,0182 0,0000 0,0450 0,0000 0,0454 0,0000
Second generation Western Europe (old EU + EFTA) 0,0071 0,5117 0,0214 0,0594 −0,0104 0,3270 0,0101 0,3611 −0,0128 0,2188 0,0033 0,7603 0,0072 0,5072 0,0215 0,0583
Immigrants New EU countries 0,1041 0,0000 0,1969 0,0000 0,1155 0,0000 0,1820 0,0000 0,1142 0,0000 0,1043 0,0000 0,0506 0,0000 0,1395 0,0000
Second generation New EU countries 0,0014 0,9375 0,0223 0,2514 −0,0114 0,4971 0,0178 0,3223 −0,0176 0,2804 0,0072 0,6634 0,0016 0,9286 0,0227 0,2443
Immigrants Canada, USA, Australia, NZ 0,1115 0,0000 0,1439 0,0000 0,0250 0,0052 0,0738 0,0000 −0,0516 0,0000 −0,0355 0,0008 0,0739 0,0000 0,1031 0,0000
Second generation Canada, USA, Australia, NZ −0,0072 0,8226 0,0568 0,2096 −0,0334 0,2476 0,0141 0,7557 −0,0342 0,1888 −0,0003 0,9954 −0,0075 0,8149 0,0565 0,2114
Immigrants MENA * 0,0651 0,0000 0,0266 0,0000 0,0805 0,0000 0,0581 0,0000 0,0623 0,0000 0,0393 0,0000 0,0454 0,0000 0,0074 0,0914
Second generation MENA * 0,0037 0,6659 0,0012 0,8916 0,0081 0,3101 0,0114 0,1621 0,0169 0,0334 0,0144 0,0673 0,0044 0,6002 0,0023 0,7831
Immigrants Asia ++ ** 0,0778 0,0000 0,1138 0,0000 0,0733 0,0000 0,1252 0,0000 0,0511 0,0000 0,0825 0,0000 0,0517 0,0000 0,0783 0,0000
Second generation Asia ++ ** 0,0067 0,4613 0,0172 0,0852 −0,0053 0,5361 0,0133 0,1713 −0,0005 0,9489 0,0190 0,0395 0,0075 0,4127 0,0183 0,0666
Immigrants Africa, excluding MENA 0,0984 0,0000 0,0270 0,0000 0,1029 0,0000 0,0646 0,0000 0,0780 0,0000 0,0453 0,0000 0,0724 0,0000 0,0077 0,1769
Second generation Africa, excluding MENA 0,0766 0,0599 0,0656 0,0910 0,0722 0,0600 0,0513 0,1699 0,0809 0,0223 0,0247 0,4843 0,0774 0,0576 0,0667 0,0860
Immigrants South and Central America 0,1156 0,0000 0,1311 0,0000 0,0963 0,0000 0,1280 0,0000 0,0579 0,0000 0,0678 0,0000 0,0925 0,0000 0,0969 0,0000
Second generation South and Central America −0,0187 0,4900 −0,0042 0,8968 0,0081 0,7701 0,0146 0,6361 0,0077 0,7834 −0,0103 0,7082 −0,0181 0,5047 −0,0032 0,9205
Others 0,0125 0,0000 0,0122 0,0000 −0,0054 0,0007 −0,0009 0,5552 −0,0058 0,0003 −0,0058 0,0001 0,0127 0,0000 0,0123 0,0000
Constant 0,0814 0,0000 0,1004 0,0000 0,0017 0,4068 0,0099 0,0000 −0,0357 0,0000 −0,0229 0,0000 0,0810 0,0000 0,0997 0,0000
Age FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Educational level controls yes yes
Educational level x field controls yes yes
Reason for immigration controls yes yes
R2 0,0133 0,0300 0,0983 0,0929 0,1546 0,1778 0,0141 0,0315
N 704450 693901 704450 693901 703308 692704 704450 693901
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Figure A2. Differences in overqualification between non-western immigrants, non-western second generation, western
immigrants, western second generation, others, and the native majority. 36 models estimated with age fixed effects and
controls for educational level (5 levels). Note: Non-western (NW) countries include the country groups MENA, Asia ++,
Africa excluding MENA and South and Central America.
Figure A3. Differences in overqualification between immigrants and the second generation from seven country-of-origin
groups, others, and the native majority by sector. Notes: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects and controls for edu-
cational level (5 levels).
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Figure A4. Differences in overqualification between immigrants, by time since immigration and seven country-of-origin
groups, the second generation from seven country-of-origin groups, others, and the native majority. Note: 4 models esti-
mated with age fixed and controls for educational level (5 levels).
Figure A5. Differences in overqualification between non-western immigrants, non-western second generation, western
immigrants, western second generation, others and the native majority. 36 models estimated with age fixed effects and
controls for educational level x field (286 groups). Note: Non-western (NW) countries include the country groups MENA,
Asia ++, Africa excluding MENA and South and Central America.
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Figure A6. Differences in overqualification between immigrants and the second generation from seven country-of-origin
groups, others, and the native majority by sector. Note: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects and controls for educa-
tional level x field (286 groups).
Figure A7. Differences in overqualification between immigrants, by time since immigration and seven country-of-origin
groups, the second generation from seven country-of-origin groups, others, and the native majority. Note: 4 models esti-
mated with age fixed effects and controls for educational level x field (286 groups).
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Figure A8. Differences in overqualification between non-western immigrants, non-western second generation, western
immigrants, western second generation, others, and the native majority. 36 models estimated with age fixed effects and
controls for stated reason for immigration (work, family, refugee, education, other reasons, a missing category, and a “not
relevant” category). Note: Non-western (NW) countries include the country groupsMENA, Asia++, Africa excludingMENA
and South and Central America.
Figure A9. Differences in overqualification between immigrants and the second generation from seven country-of-origin
groups, others, and the native majority by sector. Note: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects and controls for stated
reason for immigration (work, family, refugee, education, other reasons, amissing category, and a “not relevant” category).
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Figure A10. Differences in overqualification between immigrants, by time since immigration and seven country-of-origin
groups, the second generation from seven country of origin groups, others, and the native majority. Note: 4 models es-
timated with age fixed effects and controls for stated reason for immigration (work, family, refugee, education, other
reasons, a missing category, and a “not relevant” category).
Figure A11. Differences in overqualification between immigrants and the second generation from seven country-of-origin
groups, others, and the native majority by educational level. Note: 4 models estimated with age fixed effects and con-
trols for stated reason for immigration (work, family, refugee, education, other reasons, a missing category, and a “not
relevant” category).
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